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Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Aventura
United States District Court,
S.D. Florida.
THE WILLIAMS ISLAND SYNAGOGUE, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF AVENTURA, Defendant.
No. 0420257CVUNGAROBENAG.
May 6, 2004.
Lawrence Richard Metsch, The Metsch Law Firm, P.A., Miami, FL, for plaintiff.
Harriet R. Lewis, Weiss Serota Helfman Pastoriza et al, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
UNGARO-BENAGES, J.
*1 THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed March 10, 2004.

THE COURT has considered the motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion on March 29, 2004 and Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion on April 13, 2004. This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

FACTS
Plaintiff Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. is a nonprofit Florida corporation whose congregation adheres to the principles and traditions of Orthodox Judaism. Complaint, at 2. The congregation now consists of approximately 200 persons, of whom ninety to ninety-five percent reside on Williams Island. Id. at 18. Plaintiff has operated at various locations on Williams Island since 1990, and for the past eight years has operated at its current location at 2000 Island Boulevard in Williams Island. Id. Plaintiff explains that the 2000 Island Boulevard location is inadequate under the precepts of Orthodox Jewish law, which require that (a) the sanctuary must face toward Jersualem--in this case, toward the east; (b) there must exist separate areas for prayer and the service of food; and (c) men and women must be able to enter and sit separately during services. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the limitations of its current facility prevent it from properly serving the religious needs of its growing membership. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, at 5.

Plaintiff has identified a location at 2600 Island Boulevard which Plaintiff claims will allow it to comply with the above requirements of Orthodox Judaism. Complaint, at 18. This location consists of a space of 6,000 square feet on the first level of the parking garage for the condominium located at 2600 Island Boulevard. Id. The parking garage location is approximately 1,000 feet from the condominium lobby and is accessible from a twenty-foot-wide walkway which is regularly used by Williams Island residents as a walking and jogging path, and which accommodates deliveries and other services for the condominium at 2600 Island Boulevard. Id. For purposes of the legal arguments made in its complaint. Plaintiff has identified a separate, arguably comparable facility operated by the condominium association at 2600 Island Boulevard. This "party room," as described by Plaintiff, is utilized by condominium residents for a variety of secular and religious gatherings and celebration. Id. at 19. Without providing information on the size or capacity of this room. Plaintiff states that these gatherings by condominium residents attract groups of as many as one hundred people. Id.

The location to which Plaintiff wishes to relocate at 2600 Island Boulevard is within a Multifamily High Density Residential District ("RMF4"). Sections 31- 143(f)(2) and (2a) of the City of Aventura Municipal Code provide that buildings, structures or land located within an RMF4 district may only be used for those uses approved within Multifamily Medium Density Residential Districts ("RMF3s"), high-rise apartments, publicly owned recreation facilities, assisted living facilities, uses accessory to these uses, and, if first approved as a conditional use, "all uses permitted in the [Community Facilities] District." Section 31-147 governs the use of land within Community Facilities, or CF, districts. Sections 31-147(a)(1) and (a)(2) govern, respectively, those uses which are permitted as of right and those uses which require prior conditional approval; subsection (a)(1)(d) provides specifically that "[c]hurches or synagogues and other houses of worship" are among those uses permitted within CF districts, while subsection (a)(2)(d) lists, among other categories, "[p]rivate fraternal, civic, charitable, professional or educational non-profit organizations" as requiring conditional approval for operation within CF districts. Section 31-73 of the municipal code governs the procedures and requirements for conditional use applications. Section 31-73(d) provides that the Community Development Department of the City of Aventura shall prepare a report summarizing the Department's assessment of whether a particular conditional use application satisfies the general criteria established by § 31-73(c). As a result of the interaction of these statutory provisions, specifically § 31-143(f)(2a), while churches, synagogues and other religious institutions are entitled to operate within CF districts as of right, they require conditional approval before being allowed to operate within RMF4 districts, while certain other nonreligious uses, including all those uses allowed in RMF3 districts, are allowed as of right in RMF4 districts.

*2 On April 8, 2002, Defendant issued a Certificate of Use which authorized Plaintiff to use the 2600 Island Boulevard location for religious exercises. Complaint, at 19. Plaintiff claims that this certificate was subsequently revoked. Id. On December 20, 2002, Plaintiff applied for conditional use approval pursuant to § 31-73 to utilize this property for religious exercises. Id. On November 6, 2003, the Community Development Department delivered a report to the City of Aventura City Commission recommending that Plaintiff's conditional use application be denied because the proposal did not make adequate provisions for parking and that the walkway to and from the proposed location would not provide safe pedestrian access. Id. On November 12, 2003, the City Commission voted to deny the conditional use application.

On December 15, 2003, Plaintiff petitioned the Appellate Division of the Eleventh Circuit Court. Miami-Dade, Florida for a writ of certiorari quashing the resolution which denied Plaintiff's conditional use application. This petition raised, in part, claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998 ("RFRA"). Fla. Stat. § 761. On April 28, 2004, upon motion by the City of Aventura and another defendant not a party to this litigation, the state circuit court entered an order dismissing that portion of Plaintiff's petition asserting claims under RLUIPA. Plaintiff's Notice of Filing in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint.

On February 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed the pending two-count complaint, seeking injunctive relief and damages against Defendant pursuant to both RLUIPA and RFRA. Plaintiff's first claim alleges that § 31-143(f)(2a) of the municipal code, to the extent it requires conditional approval by the City Commission before religious organizations such as Plaintiff may locate within RMF4 districts, violates §§ 2000cc(b)(1) and (b)(2) of RLUIPA because the groups which use the party room located in the condominium at 2600 Island Boulevard are comparable nonreligious assemblies which have been treated on more favorable terms than Plaintiff. [FN1] Plaintiff argues further that the City's decision to deny the conditional use application violates Plaintiff's rights under § 2000cc(a)(1), because this decision imposes a substantial burden on the congregation's exercise of its religious beliefs, namely worship within a temple that conforms with the tenets of Orthodox Judaism. [FN2] Plaintiff's second count claims that the City's denial of Plaintiff's conditional use application violates Florida Statute § 761.03(1) by imposing a substantial burden on the congregation's religious beliefs in the same manner. [FN3]

FN1. Section 2000cc(b) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Equal Terms
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.
(2) Nondiscrimination
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.
FN2. Section 2000cc(a)(1) provides:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest: and
(B) is the least restrictive means of further that compelling governmental interest.
FN3. Section 761.03(1) provides:
The government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except that government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
(a) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
On March 10, 2004, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the complaint should be dismissed as Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action and that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Motion to Dismiss Complaint, at 9.

LEGAL STANDARD
*3 When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [FN4] the Court must liberally construe the complaint in Plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), and may only grant the motion where it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which could entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45- 46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Moreover, the Court must, at this stage of the litigation, accept the allegations contained in Plaintiff's complaint as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
FN4. Defendant argues first that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this complaint and second that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, but Defendant does not identify the rule of civil procedure on which it relies in making its motion to dismiss. As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that challenges to a Plaintiff's standing require the same presumption of the truth of Plaintiff's factual allegations which applies in motions arising under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court therefore analyzes Defendant's first argument under Rule 12(b)(6). Although Defendant's second argument asserts that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Defendant's legal arguments do not explain specifically the reasons for which subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist over Plaintiff's claims. Based on Defendant's fourth argument, also discussed below, the Court infers that Defendant is arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist because the statutes on which Plaintiff's claims are based are unconstitutional. To the extent this argument presents a legal question regarding the construction of these statutes, it is properly characterized as an attack on Plaintiff's underlying claims and should be considered under Rule 12(b)(6). In any event, as Defendant's argument has been squarely rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 2004 WL 842527 (11th Cir. Apr.21, 2004), the Court need not conduct a separate inquiry as to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's claims arise under RLUIPA and RFRA, and the Court is satisfied that subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), respectively.

ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff has standing to maintain this action as the complaint alleges that the November 12, 2003 denial of a conditional use permit has resulted in a redressible violation of Plaintiff's rights under RLUIPA.
Defendant argues first that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring these claims, as Plaintiff's injuries will not be realized until Plaintiff exhausts unspecified state judicial and administrative remedial procedures associated with the denial of a conditional use application. [FN5] The Court has considered Plaintiff's claims, and concludes that Plaintiff has standing to bring the present complaint.
FN5. Defendant's motion to dismiss was filed prior to the Appellate Division's April 28, 2004 order dismissing Plaintiff's state-court claims
under RLUIPA, and Defendant's arguments are in large part rendered moot by virtue of that decision. Defendant had argued that Plaintiff could not bring a justiciable claim in federal court while its RLUIPA claims were pending before a state court, as the pendency of this action somehow rendered Plaintiff's alleged injury speculative. However, even had those claims remained pending before the state court, this argument would have been unavailing as the Court concludes that Plaintiff's injury was sustained upon the denial of a conditional use permit in November 2003.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "[a] party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must demonstrate: 1) an injury in fact or an invasion of a legally protected interest; 2) a direct causal relationship between the injury and the challenged action; and 3) a likelihood of redressability." Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 2004 WL 842527 *4 (11th Cir. Apr.21, 2004) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). Furthermore, "[i]n evaluating whether a party has standing, we must 'accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." ' Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). In this case, Plaintiff's alleged injury consists of being unable to worship in a temple whose size and location accommodates the religious beliefs of its members. The actionable injury caused by Defendant is its November 12, 2003 decision, allegedly in violation of RLUIPA and RFRA, to deny Plaintiff permission to relocate to a property which would allow the congregation's members to worship in accordance with their beliefs. Without reaching the merits of Plaintiff's complaint, the Court, for purposes of the third factor identified in Midrash Sephardi, has considered the complaint and concludes that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff is within the remedies available under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), and RFRA, Fla. Stat. § 761.03(2), and, if granted, would redress the injury identified by Plaintiff. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has plead an existing, redressible injury to a protected right and has standing to proceed with this complaint. [FN6]
FN6. To the extent that Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing could have been construed to suggest that this Court should abstain adjudication of Plaintiff's complaint pending the state court proceedings, this argument has been rendered moot by virtue of the Appellate Division's order of dismissal.
II. Defendant's denial of a conditional use permit may substantially burden Plaintiff's exercise of its religious beliefs in violation of RLUIPA where the requested variance is required to accommodate the needs of Plaintiff's congregation
*4 Defendant argues next that the act of denying a conditional use permit to a religious institution does not constitute a "substantial burden" as that term is used in RLUIPA. In response, Plaintiff observes that other federal district courts have found the denial of special or conditional use permits to constitute substantial burdens under RLUIPA where the requested variances were required to accommodate the needs of an expanding congregation. Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792 ----8-9 (W.D.Tex.2004); Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck 280 F.Supp.2d 230, 241-42 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Here, Plaintiff claims that the facility in which it has been operating for the past eight years has, in some ways, been rendered inadequate by the increasing size of Plaintiff's congregation. (In other ways, namely that Plaintiff's current location does not face toward the cast, it has presumably been inadequate all along.) In the above cases, other courts have recognized that the denial of a zoning variance under similar circumstances may amount to a substantial burden on the exercise of religious beliefs. In Westchester Day School, for example, the court explained
Defendants charge that WDS[, the Plaintiff,] has failed to demonstrate how [the defendant municipality] is substantially burdening their exercise of religion where the students at WDS have been, and continue to be, able to gather to pray and be educated just as they did before WDS applied for a modification of a special use permit. Defendants' argument misses the point. It is the burden on the quality of the religious education that concerns us here. While it is true that the students of WDS may still, without the special permit modification gather to pray and be educated, their religious experience is limited by the current size and condition of the school buildings. Moreover, WDS, should be able, within reason, to accommodate the growing number of students who wish to pursue a Jewish education at WDS.
Westchester Day School, 280 F.Supp. at 241-42. The undersigned recognizes that Castle Hills First Baptist Church and Westchester Day School differ factually from the present case insofar as there the plaintiffs sought to modify structures and facilities within which they were already operating, and were not seeking permission to operate in entirely new locations. The Court, however, finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive for the proposition that, under certain circumstances, the denial of a land use permit may so prevent a religious congregation from fully practicing the tenets of its beliefs as to constitute a substantial burden for purposes of RLUIPA analysis.
In reply to Plaintiff's argument that the denial of a zoning variance may constitute a substantial burden. Defendant argues that the Court should adopt the test articulated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (2003), and find that such a denial does not substantially burden Plaintiff's members' exercise of their religious beliefs. In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, the court held that, "in the context of RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, a land-use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise--including the use of real property for the purpose therof within the regulated jurisdiction--effectively impracticable." Id . at 761. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently considered and rejected this formulation in Midrash Sephardi, a case in which two synagogues located in the town of Surfside. Florida argued that the town's denial of zoning variances which would have allowed them to continue in their existing locations violated the synagogues' rights under RLUIPA.
*5 In Midrash Sephardi, the court "decline[d] to adopt the Seventh Circuit's definition" of a substantial burden, and held instead that this term "is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Thus a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct." Midrash Sephardi, 2004 WL 842527 at *9. The Eleventh Circuit then went on to make certain conclusions which are pertinent to the present dispute. In that case, the synagogues argued that the town's denial of a zoning variance imposed a substantial burden on the synagogues' congregations by requiring them to walk, on average, larger distances to worship because Orthodox Judaism prohibits the use of motorized transportation on the Sabbath, thereby burdening ill, young or very old congregants. The synagogues argued that this result, and the resulting decrease in attendance at religious services, constituted a substantial burden for purposes of RLUIPA. The Eleventh Circuit rejected these consequences as substantial burdens under the facts of that case, finding that, given the distances involved, requiring the adherents of Orthodox Judaism to walk outside the relevant zoning district would not constitute a substantial burden. Id. at ----9-10. [FN7]
FN7. The court also rejected as "substantial burdens" the plaintiffs' arguments that, absent a variance, they would be unable to find facilities suitable to accommodate their congregation in the permitted district, and that the conditional use application process itself was a burden upon the synagogues. Midrash Sephardt, 2004 WL 842527 at *9 n. 11.
However, before coming to this narrow conclusion, the court found that the plaintiffs in that case did not allege in their complaint that the disputed location had some religious significance such that their faith required a synagogue at that particular site. Id. at *9. By comparison, in this case, Plaintiff claims that its current location has become inadequate to allow Plaintiff's congregation to worship in accordance with their beliefs-- specifically, that the current location does not face cast, does not allow separation between the areas for service of food and for prayer and does not allow men and women to enter and worship separately. Complaint, at 18. Plaintiff claims that, given the congregation's size, relocation to the property located at 2600 Island Boulevard will allow Plaintiff to correct these problems. In light of the standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, the undersigned finds that the denial of a conditional use permit, by preventing Plaintiff from relocating to a facility which may allow its increased membership to worship more consistently with the requirements of Orthodox Judaism, could have the effect of requiring Plaintiff's members to forego their religious beliefs. Consistent with the holdings in Castle Hills First Baptist Church and Westchester Day School, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plead a cognizable claim, and that dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is unwarranted under these circumstances.
Throughout its motion to dismiss, Defendant has identified a number of nondiscriminatory factors which allegedly contributed to the City Commission's decision to deny Plaintiff a conditional use permit. At this stage of the proceedings, however, the Court lacks the information necessary to proceed with the analysis required by § 2000cc(a). There is no evidence from which the Court can conclude as a matter of law that the outright denial of a conditional use permit rather than, for example, modification of Plaintiff's variance request was or was not the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest embodied by the City's land-use regulations. At this point, the Court concludes only that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim by pleading an injury which, if proven, could constitute a substantial burden for purposes of RLUIPA.
III. Plaintiff has alleged disparate treatment by the City Commission vis-a- vis comparable private organizations in violation of § 2000cc(b) of RLUIPA
*6 Defendant's third argument is that the denial of a conditional use permit does not violate § 2000cc(b), because Defendant's decision to deny Plaintiff use of the facility within the garage at 2600 Island Boulevard has not treated Plaintiff unequally vis-a-vis the private groups allowed to use the party room located in the condominium at that address because the two facilities are not properly comparable. Defendant's argument, however, misconstrues Plaintiff's position. Plaintiff does not argue that the two facilities themselves should be compared to determine whether they are similar. Rather, Plaintiff argues that, in this case, the zoning scheme adopted by Defendant has resulted in the following inequitable situation which violates both RLUIPA and the RFRA: the private associations which occupy the party room at 2600 Island Boulevard are not required to undergo the conditional use application process required before Plaintiff may occupy the disputed garage location. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, at 8-9. Thus, while Defendant points to functional differences between the party room and the location Plaintiff desires to occupy, the relevant consideration is the procedural differences between what is required of Plaintiff and what is required of those private organizations occupying a space under comparable circumstances within the same zoning district. Although the Eleventh Circuit has held that requiring religious institutions to submit to the conditional use application process is not itself a substantial burden, see supra n. 5, Plaintiff's legal argument is that requiring religious institutions to submit to a process which does not apply to private organizations or occupants is a separate question, one arising under subsection (b) rather than (a) of the RLUIPA, and one which, when reached, shall be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard adopted in Midrash Sephardi, 2004 WL 842527 at ----13-14.
IV. RLUIPA and RFRA are consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
Finally, Defendant argues that RLUIPA and RFRA are unconstitutional to the extent that they operate to invalidate zoning regulations of general, nondiscriminatory applicability. In a thorough consideration of this exact question, the Eleventh Circuit held in Midrash Sephardi that RLUIPA does not exceed Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and does not abridge state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Midrash Sephardi, 2004 WL 842527 at *25. To the extent that the relevant statutory language of RFRA mirrors the operative language in RLUIPA, that Plaintiff's RFRA claim duplicates its RLUIPA claims and that this claim arises from the same operative facts as Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim, the Court finds that the RFRA claim presented by Plaintiff is consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under the three-prong test created by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and applied to RLUIPA in Midrash Sephardi.
CONCLUSION
*7 Accepting the allegations contained in Plaintiff's complaint as true, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for relief pursuant to RLUIPA and RFRA. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant's denial of a conditional use permit which would allow Plaintiff to relocate to a facility necessary to accommodate better the congregation's size and religious beliefs imposes a substantial burden on Plaintiff's congregation's exercise of its religious beliefs.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged a violation of § 2000cc(b) insofar as Plaintiff claims that the immediate effect of the zoning scheme adopted by the City of Aventura is to require religious institutions such as Plaintiff to apply for a conditional use permit under circumstances in which similar private organizations occupying a facility in the same area would not be required to undergo the conditional use process. For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint is DENIED.
S.D.Fla.,2004.
Williams Island Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Aventura
2004 WL 1059798 (S.D.Fla.)
END OF DOCUMENTy.